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ARTICLE
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY: EXPANDING SEC'
DISCLOSURES TO PROMOTE MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTALISM
Terra Pfund
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the birth of modem environmental regulation in the 1970's, the United States government, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and citizens alike have been struggling over the best means to curtail
environmental degradation and ensure both environmental compliance and pollution control. While the current
Administration has consistently cut the EPA's enforcement budget, new and innovative solutions need to be
found to keep regulatory enforcement on track.
A logical. yet overlooked solution to this regulatory enforcement quandary can be found in corporate
Green Management' and market-based incentives. 2 Over the past 30 years, the EPA has operated under a
standards-based regulatory program.3 This command-control regulatory solution has provided dramatic
improvements in the handling and disposing of toxic and hazardous materials, air quality and water quality.4
However. even though EPA's command-control regulatory program has been successful, there is growing
concern that the current program "will not be able to address the most pressing environmental challenges in an
efficient or cost-effective manner."5 Many environmentalists, including employees of the EPA, are now
advocating a second-generation regulatory system based on performance rather than baseline standards.
Regulating the environment from a performance standard such as market-based incentives "places a
greater emphasis on high quality environmental information and environmental performance indicators to drive
decision-making and priority setting."6 The information disclosed is used as a tool for public awareness,
allowing the investor and the consumer to make an environmentally educated investment decision or purchase.
These -green investments" are a catalyst for making environmental performance indicators important in the
decision-making within the corporation. When publicly traded corporations make financial disclosures about
their environmental liabilities. it allows for public choice. The investor and consumer will use their investment
dollars "to promote corporate attainment of national environmental goals."7  These disclosures give
* L.L.M., Golden Gate University School of Law, 2003; J.D., Widener University School of Law, 2002; B.S.S.p.
Communications. Politics and Law, Emerson College, 1996. The author wishes to thank Clifford Rechtschaffen and Alan
Ramo for their guidance on this paper. and James R. May and the Mid-Atlantic Environmental Law Center for fostering a
passion for environmental law.
Susannah Blake Goodman et al., The Environmental Fiduciary: The Case for Incorporating Environmental Factors into
Investment Management Policies 3 <http://www.rosefdn.org/images/EFreport.pdf> (accessed Feb. 9, 2004).
2 Nicholas Franco. Presentation, Corporate Environmental Disclosure: Opportunities to Harness Market Forces to
Improve Corporate Environmental Performance 3 <http://www.corporatesunshine.org/epaaba.pdf> (Keystone, Colo.,
March 8-11, 2001).
See general/v id.
4 Id. at 2 (citing U.S. EPA Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, US. EPA 's 25th Anniversary Report: 1970-1995
<http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/25year/index.htm> (1996).
Franco, supra n. 2. at 2.
6 Id.
John W. Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure. 14 Va.
Envtl. L.J. 225, 265 (1995).
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corporations incentives to improve their environmental management, and strive for greater, more cost effective
environmental compliance.8
In 2000, the Office of Cooperative Environmental Management, under the EPA, reviewed available
academic research regarding the nexus between corporate environmental performance and financial
performance.9 The study concluded that there was a positive relationship. Evidence showed financial benefits
to those corporations taking a proactive approach to environmental management and a demand for corporate
environmental performance information from capital market participants.' 0
Yet, regardless of the demand, publicly traded companies (registrants) are not disclosing environmental
information as required by the SEC.1 Furthermore; studies indicate that the disclosures that are being reported
are often incomplete and inaccurate. 12 In order for a market-based incentive to operate as a regulatory device,
adjustments within the SEC's environmental disclosure requirements must be addressed.
This note will offer a discussion on how more rigid enforcement of environmental disclosures under the
Securities and Exchange Commission will supplement current environmental regulations, foster Green
Management, and provide market-based incentives to achieve national environmental policy goals. Part II
explains the connections between Green Management, ethical/environmental investing, corporate
environmental disclosure and the market-based incentive program. Part III offers a brief description of current
environmental disclosure requirements under modem environmental statutes. how they offer supplemental help,
but alone cannot sustain a market-based incentive program. Part IV discusses the Blue Sky Laws'3 and the
history of the Securities and Exchange Commission's environmental disclosure requirements. Part V offers
suggestions to strengthen the current disclosure requirements for environmental liability and evaluates current
trends in the SEC and the EPA. This article concludes that a market-based incentive program is indeed a
valuable supplement to the current command-control regulatory programs currently in place. However. in order
for a market-based incentive program to be successful, additional environmental disclosures-and enforcement
of those disclosures-are required.
II. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ETHICAL INVESTOR
Prior to investigating the current environmental disclosure requirements under various environmental
statutes and under the SEC, it is important to note the relationship between corporate responsibility and ethical
or environmental investing. As previously noted, the 1970's gave birth to the American environmental
revolution. Environmentalism has since become integrated into the core of American values.' 4
"Environmentalism has become a part of 'the American consensus.' an idea deeply fixed in the firmament of
values that define America's basic political beliefs."1 Environmental values have also made their way into
American corporate cultures through the concept of ethical investing.' 6  Shareholder concerns for the
environment have begun to force companies to subscribe to Green Management and to demand increasingly
8 id.
Envtl. Capital Mkts. Comm. Green Dividends?: The Relutionship Berteen Firms' Environmental Perfbrmance and
Financial Performance 6 (U.S. EPA 2000).
o Franco, supra n. 2, at 6.
'Id. at 7.
1 Id.
" See infra nn. 61-63.
14 Elizabeth Glass Geltman and Andrew E. Skroback. Environmental Activism and the Ethical Investor. 22 Iowa J. Corp.
L. 465, 466 (1997).
15 Id. (citing Walter A. Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy 340 (3d ed. 1995)).
1 id.
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specific environmentally friendly behavior.' 7 The Green Management of corporations embodies the theory that
"environmentally driven innovation can lead to cost savings and lower compliance costs, and create new
efficiencies, thus improving corporate competitive posture."' 8  Substantial financial benefits may accrue to
"corporations with aggressive environmental programs-and these benefits are passed along to shareholders in
the form of increased earnings and corporate value."' 9
Green Management not only satisfies the American investor's desire for corporations to conform to
American environmental values, it has proven to have a positive impact on corporate financial performance. 20
"Economic theory holds that in the idealized, perfectly competitive economy, the self-motivated behaviors of
individuals and corporations will result in efficient patterns of production and consumption. This equilibrium of
production and consumption is efficient in the sense that no one person can be better off without making
another person worse off."21
Research conducted by the Rose Foundation22 points to three specific conclusions: (1) "Investors who
choose the environmental leaders in an industry-balanced portfolio were found to do as well and sometimes
better than choosing the environmental laggards in each industry;" (2) "Equity portfolios composed of stocks
with good environmental ratings are likely to outperform the stock market while controlling for some
macroeconomic trends;" and (3) "Corporations with sound environmental management systems generally have
superior stock market performance." 23
Corporations with rigorous Green Management systems in place are saving money through energy
efficiency, waste reduction, ecologically aware manufacturing productions, and lower com liance costs. As a
result, Green Management systems are increasing their corporate competitive advantage. Alternatively, a
corporation with significant environmental liabilities can drastically reduce profitability, earnings, and
shareholder value.2 5
' Not only has the non-profit environmental community focused on the connection between ethical
investing, Green Management, and corporate disclosure, but the EPA has as well. In a 2001 Enforcement Alert,
the EPA noted that environmental information-including a corporation's compliance history and involvement
in a federal environmental enforcement action-may be used by the public to guide purchasing and investment
decisions. 2 6 The EPA went on to state that "full and fair disclosure of material information related to a firm's
environmental performance, compliance and liabilities is essential if stock markets are to accurately reflect the
financial condition of publicly traded companies." 27 Most importantly was EPA's belief that "enforcement of
7 Id. at 468.
1 Goodman, supra n. 1, at 3.
9 1d.
20 See id.
21 Franco, supra n. 2, at 3.
22 The Rose Foundation is a non-profit organization located in Oakland, CA. Their mission includes: fostering community
and environmental stewardship; improving communications between businesses and their neighbors; recognizing
individual responsibility for the environmental consequences of personal actions; forging positive links between
environmental stewardship and sustainable job creation; harnessing economic power to leverage environmental
sustainability; and instilling respect for the inalienable rights protected by our nation's constitution and the essential
human rights to clean air, clean water and individual dignity. The Rose Foundation for Communities and Environment,
About Us <http://www.rosefdn.org/aboutus.html> (accessed Feb. 9, 2004).
23 Goodman, supra n. 1, at 23-25.24 Id. at 3.
25 id
26 EPA Enforcement Alert, US. EPA Notifying Defendants of Securities and Exchange Commission's Environmental
Disclosure Requirements I <http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/newsletters/civil/enfalert/sec.pdf> (Oct. 2001).27 d
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environmental disclosure requirements helps ensure that companies complying with [these] obligations are not
disadvantaged in the market by firms that ignore the duty to disclose their environmental liabilities."2 8
In 2002, the EPA disclosed that 74 percent of the publicly traded corporations that it surveyed openly
violate the SEC's environmental financial debt accounting regulations.29 The report went on to state that "the
high percentage of publicly traded corporations [are] hiding their environmental debt from shareholders and the
lack of enforcement by the SEC 30 for its environmental accounting filing regulation is rewarding corporate
noncompliance to US environmental laws."3' In order for the EPA's current command-control environmental
regulatory program to be supplemented with a market-based incentive program, both agencies (EPA and SEC)
must work together to ensure adequate disclosure and thus foster ethical investing. This cooperation can be
attained through mandatory environmental disclosure and adequate enforcement of disclosure regulations
(discussed in more detail in Part V below).
Whereas corporations may be willing to disclose their Green Management practices, this disclosure
alone is inadequate for an effective market-based incentive program. The ethical investor not only needs to
know corporate Green Management policy to make an educated investment choice, but environmental liabilities
as well. Even though the SEC sets forth specific environmental disclosure requirements, what is currently
mandated offers the ethical investor only a cursory review of the corporate environmental portfolio. Moreover,
current disclosure requirements are not being adequately enforced.32
Investor protection is the driving force behind the SEC's regulatory scheme. It is the SEC's job to
administer and enforce the federal securities laws in order to protect investors and to maintain fair, honest, and
efficient markets. In addition to protecting investors from fraudulent securities transactions, it is imperative that
investor protection should also include effective dissemination of corporate policies and liabilities.
The SEC acknowledged in a 1979 Interpretive Release that "environmental statutes could have a
material economic impact on [those] corporations." 33 This acknowledgement should be articulated through
stringent extensive environmental disclosure requirements and the enforcement of those requirements. While
disclosure requirements do not set substantive environmental standards, they do improve the quality and
quantity of information that reaches investors and community advocates. 34 Mandatory disclosure requirements
strengthen corporate accountability by providing investors with the tools to have a significant influence on
market forces raising performance and driving corporate environmental compliance improvement. 35
It is evident that corporate responsibility and ethical or environmental investing are linked to one
another. Additionally it is evident that corporate environmental disclosure and environmental compliance are
linked. For a market-based incentive program to be successful, these links must be fused together to form a
chain which will in turn promote higher environmental standards. Before that fusion is made however, it is
important to note why current disclosure requirements are insufficient alone.
28
29A study conducted by Martin Freedman, professor of accounting at the College of Business and Economics at Townson
University in Maryland found that of the EPA's list of 900 publicly traded potentially responsible parties listed on the
National Priority List found most companies make little or no disclosure effort on environmental expense/liability
reporting. Donald Southerland, EPA Reveals US Publicly Traded Corporations Hide Billions in Environmental Debt
<http://www.riskworld.comi/NEWS/02q2/nwO2aO96.htm> (last updated Apr. 9, 2002).
3oiIn the last 20 years the SEC has only enforced its Regulation S-K financial environmental accounting regulation once.
Id.
31 Id. (emphasis added).
32 EPA Enforcement Alert, supra n. 26.
3 Exch. Act Release 16224, 1979 WL 169925, at I (Sept. 27, 1979).
- Michelle Leighton, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, and Lyuba Zarsky, Beyond Good Deeds: Case Studies and a New Policy
Agenda for Corporate Accountability I 8 (Natural Heritage Inst. 2002).
-3 Id
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III. CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The United States Congress has enacted various environmental laws addressing pollution control,
environmental degradation, sustainability, and liability for environmental violations. The majority of these
statutes contain disclosure requirements that are predominantly used for environmental regulatory enforcement.
While much of the disclosed information is shared between the EPA and the SEC,36 this cooperation has proven
to be ineffective as a tool for a market-based incentive program. While the EPA shares its compliance actions
with the SEC," SEC disclosure regulations are inadequate, often inaccurately categorizing environmental
expenditures. Furthermore, the information disclosed is insufficient, and that deficiency in turn is not
corrected.38 If the public does not have access to accurate disclosures, a market-based incentive program cannot
be successful.
An overview of disclosures required by environmental statutes illustrates that these laws alone cannot
foster a market-based incentive environmental program. This section will show while the applicable
environmental statutes demand disclosure, they do not always promote public disclosure. Therefore the statutes
only support governmental regulation and enforcement. In order to promote a performance-based system, a
greater emphasis must be placed on "high quality environmental information and environmental performance
indicators to drive-decision making and priority setting." 39  Current disclosure requirements under
environmental statutes fail as market based incentives because they are not adequately focused on public access
to the information disclosed.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) declares it the policy of the United States to
.'encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment" and to "promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment." 40 This policy is implemented by requiring federal
agencies to "integrate environmental issues into their decision making processes." 41 The influence NEPA has
on corporate disclosures is limited to the requirement that the SEC consider environmental issues when
regulating corporate disclosure.42 However, because corporations are private entities, NEPA has no substantive
corporate application. There is no inherent duty for a corporation to make an assessment under NEPA of its
environmental impact or environmental liabilities. Without corporate application, the public cannot utilize
NEPA to foster a market-based incentive program.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liabilities Act (CERCLA) were passed to regulate the growing amount of toxic
and hazardous materials used by industry. RCRA establishes a "cradle to grave" regulatory program to prevent
present and future waste disposal from endangering public heath or environment.43  CERCLA establishes
authorities and processes to remediate contamination from past disposal, which now endangers or threatens to
36 The EPA and the SEC staff have worked together to "increase the flow of information between the two agencies. The
EPA regularly sends the SEC lists of those companies barred from government contracts under the [Clean Air Act] or the[Clean Water Act]; companies named as [potentially responsible parties] PRPs for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites;
and names of those companies involved in any criminal or civil proceeding under federal environmental laws." Bagby,
supra n. 7. at 233, nn. 33-36.
7 Id
38 See Southerland, supra n. 29.
39 Franco, supra n. 2, at 2.
4 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
" Bagby, supra n. 7, at 234.
42 Id at 235.
1 John G. Sprankling and Gregory S. Weber, The Law of Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances in a Nutshell 161(West 1997).
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endanger public health or the environment. 4 4 Corporations may be liable for their handling, processing, and
disposing of hazardous materials under RCRA and their past site contamination under CERCLA.4 5
Although RCRA and CERCLA have had a dramatic impact on corporate environmental liability, their
primary focus is on waste management, disposal, and remediation. While the explicit disclosure requirements
are used to identify Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs);46 amounts and types of hazardous substances found
in storage, treatment, or disposal sites;47 and hazardous waste releases into the environment,48 the disclosure
information that is provided is bewildering and not readily available to the public.49
Additionally, disclosures under both statutes are made to the EPA and not to the public investor. While
the investor may access this information through a Freedom of Information Act request to the EPA, the inability
of the public to directly access this information makes both RCRA and CERCLA ineffective for disclosure
under a market-based incentive program.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act
(EPCRTKA).50 EPCRTKA empowers the public with access to information about chemical hazards and toxics
within their community. It requires corporations to disclose their use of hazardous and toxic chemicals through
the filing of Toxic Chemical Release Forms (TCRF), Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), and Emergency and
Hazardous Chemical Inventory Forms (EHCIF)." Each of these disclosure forms must be filed with the
appropriate state agency and with the EPA. EPA maintains a toxic release inventory (TRI) for each chemical
that a corporation used based on its TCRF disclosures.52 EPA must make available all TRIs to the public
through computer telecommunications. 3
While the TRI requirement of the EPCRTKA does mandate corporate disclosures and public access, the
information contains extensive scientific data, challenging for the average investor without a scientific
background to understand and disseminate. The primary purpose of the Act is to ensure that the community
has adequate knowledge of toxins affecting them and can develop emergency and response plans in the event of
a chemical release. While TRI data is being accessed by environmental groups and the public more frequently,
it is not applicable to every publicly traded corporation regulated by the SEC. Only corporations using toxics
above certain threshold levels are required to submit TRI data. Therefore, EPCRTKA disclosure requirements
are not applicable to the remaining corporations affecting the environment. Additionally, only members of the
public who are specifically aware of the statute and the reporting requirements have ready access to the
information.
44 Id. at 256.
451 Id. at 166.
46 40 C.F.R. § 300.305(b)(3) (2003).
4 40 C.F.R. § 265.1 et seq.
48 40 C.F.R. § 302.6.
49 "Even a brief treatment of RCRA illustrates that only someone with a fairly complete understanding of the Act would
be able to find a particular corporation's disclosure information. Certainly the information is not widely available to
potential investors and stockholders; moreover, a sophisticated analysis of the available information will be required
before the information can be used in the marketplace. The difficulty of accessing and processing information under
RCRA prevents potential investors from making informed investment decisions. RCRA. therefore, fails as an effective
market-based incentive." Bagby, supra n. 7. at 253.
'o Congress was spurred to action by a toxic release in Bohpal. India that killed thousands. Sprankling, supra n. 43, at 91.
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-23.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1 10230).
SId.
54 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 247.
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EPCRTKA provides a foundation for corporate disclosure and public empowerment and is therefore a
gateway statute for implementing a market-based incentive environmental program.55 Still, the foundation
alone is inadequate. Local governments charged with providing the information often do not have the funding
for data management and therefore cannot successfully implement the program. 56 Due to the inaccessibility of
the data, investors cannot find adequate information on corporate environmental compliance and liability.
Therefore, EPCRTKA alone falls short on environmental disclosure instrument for creating a market-based
incentive environmental program.
Regulatory and pollution control statutes such as the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Clean Air Act
(CAA) mandate disclosure. However, the disclosures in both statutes are made through self-monitoring57 and
self auditing.58 While this self-monitoring is a mandatory disclosure, the disclosure is made only to the EPA or
state agencies. 59 As with the environmental statutes previously discussed, the public is only privy to the
information through a Freedom of Information Act60 request. Without easier public access to the disclosure of
environmental liabilities, neither the CWA nor the CAA act as a market based incentive.6 1
As the discussion above indicates, while Congress has enacted many environmental statutes that provide
for disclosure of environmental liabilities, these statutes are predominantly regulatory. They do not address the
ss Bagby, supra n. 7, at 248. In addition to EPCRTKA, the U.S. Congress enacted the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990
(PPA). Like the TCRF requirement in EPCRTKA, the PPA requires owners and operators of facilities to file a Toxic
Chemical Source Reduction and Recycling Report. Id. Data is then collected by the EPA and made available to the
public. Id. at 249.t Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 Mich.
L. Rev. 1795, 1835 (1989) ("While computerized services are developing, many local emergency planning committees
cannot afford to study their own needs nor establish the connections that would allow them to function. Instead, they are
opting to take the data as hard copy, where it often sits in boxes unused.").
For example, under the Clean Air Act, industry must comply with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).
Emissions data is submitted to the EPA to insure the industry is operating within the NAAQS guidelines. Likewise, under
the Clean Water Act, a permit holder must comply with their National Discharge Elimination System (NYPDES)
guidelines. Records of compliance under the CAA's NAAQS and the CWA's NPDES are submitted to the EPA Data
Monitoring Reports (DMRs). While the submission of a DMR is a disclosure of industrial or corporate activity, it is not
easily accessible to the common investor or shareholder, and only may be obtained through a FOIA request.
8 The EPA defines an environmental audit as "a systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated
entities of a facility's operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
There are two basic types of environmental audits--compliance audits and management audits. Compliance audits are an
independent assessment of the corporation's compliance with environmental statutes and regulations. Management audits
examine the corporation's systems and procedures to assure environmental compliance. Patrick J. Ennis, Student Author,
Environmental Audits: Protective Shields or Smoking Guns? How to Encourage the Private Sector to Perform
Environmental Audits and Still Maintain Effective Enforcement, 42 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 389, 395 (1992). A
successful auditing program may include (1) explicit top management support for environmental auditing and the
commitment to follow up on the findings; (2) an environmental auditing function independent of audited activities; (3)
adequate auditor training and staffing; (4) a process which collects and analyzes, interprets, and documents information
sufficient to achieve audit results; (5) explicit audit program, objectives, scope, resources, and frequency; (6) a process
which includes quality assurance procedures to verify the accuracy and thoroughness of the audit; and (7) a process which
includes specific procedures to prepare promptly candid, clear, and appropriate written reports on audit findings,
corrective actions, and schedules for implementation. EPA EnvironmentalAuditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg.
25004, 25008 (July 9, 1986).
59 CAA NAAQS emissions standards, CWA NPDES permitting and DMR reports.
6 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows the public to gain access to materials and information
from government agencies that may not otherwise be available. See id.
61 See Bagby, supra n. 7, at 259.
124
MELPR, Vol. 11, No. 2
need for corporate disclosure and the breadth of corporate environmental liability in today's technology driven
world. With the growth of the hi-tech industry, corporate operations though deemed "Green" deal with highly
toxic and hazardous materials that have significant impacts on air quality, groundwater, and local energy
resources. In order for a market-based incentive program to be successful, corporate environmental disclosures
need to be provided not only to local and federal agencies, but to the public consumer and investors as well.
Without the availability of information regarding environmental liabilities, investors and community members
can only make uneducated decisions. The values placed on green investments are vastly diminished because the
extent of corporate liability, environmental impacts, and non-compliance are virtually unknown.
IV. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
After the stock market crash in 1929, the United States Congress together enacted the Securities Act of
193362 and then the Security Exchange Act of 1934,63 fondly known as the Blue Sky Laws.M The Blue Sky
Laws were enacted "to protect consumers in the financial markets against excessive speculation,
misrepresentation, and exploitation involving unsound, worthless, or fraudulent securities." 65 The Blue Sky
Laws are a disclosure-based regulatory mechanism that requires the mandatory disclosure of "material"
financial and non-financial information in statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). 66
The 1933 Act requires corporations to file a registration statement with the SEC before securities can be
offered for sale to the public.67 "The Securities Act of 1933 is specifically intended to 'provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities. "68 The 1934 Act is much more broad, regulating all facets of the
public trading of securities. 69 Registered corporations must disclose material information when securities are
registered for trading, and companies must then file annual, quarterly, and other periodic reports with the SEC.70
"Disclosure is the keystone of the entire structure of federal securities legislation." 7' The SEC has the
power to provide detailed guidance regarding the form and content of disclosures. 72 The Commission may
adopt "such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."73 However, until the 1970's, the SEC had not addressed disclosure
requirements for environmental liabilities.
62 The Securities Act of 1933 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.6' The Security Exchange Act of 1934 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.64 **Beginning in the late nineteenth century the eastern industrialists found fertile ground for securities in the developing
American frontier. There were many questionable practices and as a result pressures arose to regulate the marketing of
fraudulently valued securities. Accordingly in 1911 Kansas passed the first state security statutory regulation which is also
known as a -blue sky law" because of its purpose to protect the Kansas farmers against the industrialists' selling them a
piece of the blue sky." Robert W. Hamilton. Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies 331
(6th ed., West 1998) (quoting Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation 7 (2d ed., West 1990)).65 Robert H. Feller. Environmental Disclosure and the Securities Laws, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 225, 227 (1995).
66 Id. at 228.
67 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Lat of Securities Regulation 7-8 (3d ed., West 1996). See 15 U.S.C. § 77f.68 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 266 (citing The Securities Act of 1933, Preface).
69See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
70 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 265.
71 Id. at 266 (internal citation omitted).
'2 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 266.
7 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak. 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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A. The Road to Environmental Disclosure
The SEC first became acquainted with environmental liabilities and disclosure requirements when
former President Richard Nixon signed NEPA into law.74 NEPA dictates that federal agencies are required to
review their regulations and processes to make sure that they are consistent with "the national policy for the
environment."7 ' As stated previously, NEPA's only influence on corporate disclosure is limited to the
requirement that the SEC consider environmental issues when promulgating rules to regulate corporate
disclosure. President Nixon catapulted this policy into action through Executive Order 11514. The order
mandated that "federal agencies shall initiate measures needed to direct their policies, plans and programs so as
to meet environmental goals."77 Regulatory programs and corrective actions from all federal agencies were
required to be submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).78
By September 1970, the SEC had failed to submit corrective action to the CEQ. The SEC was only
prompted to comply with the executive order by a rulemaking petition filed by the Natural Resources Defense
Council. Inc. (NRDC).79 The SEC responded to NRDC by issuing an interpretive release in 1971 entitled
Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights.80
The release provided modest guidance to the then-current SEC disclosure requirements under
Regulation S-K.81 It simply reiterated disclosure requirements under the Blue Sky Laws and included
compliance with other pertinent environmental laws that would "cause material changes in [the] registrant's
business done or intended to be done."82 Additionally, it required the disclosure of pending or contemplated
litigation.
In December 1971, the SEC promised "to actively consider amendments . . . in the near future" but
declined to revise the disclosure rules as requested by NRDC." In March 1973, the NRDC sued to challenge
the SEC's failure to propose more stringent rules. 8 The litigation prompted the SEC to adopt disclosure
" The National Environmental Polic 'Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331
et seq.). See also general/v William H. Rogers, Environmental Law 801-18 (2d ed., West 1994).
' Bagby, supra n. 7, at 228 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2000)). "The Joint Conference Report underscores this as a
separate and new obligation on all federal agencies unless expressly prohibited by existing law applicable to the agency or
unless the agency's full compliance would be impossible under other applicable laws. The conferees explicitly stated that
the language 'to the fullest extent possible' shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance...
The language . . . is intended to assure that ... no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing
statutory authorizations to avoid compliance." Bagby, supra n. 7. at 229 n. 11 (citing Conf. Rep. No. 765, at § 102, (Dec.
17, 1969) (reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767, 2770)).
76 See Exec. Or. 11514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (Mar. 7, 1970).
" Id. at § 1.
78 Id. at §§ 1, 2(a), and 2(d).
79 Bagby supra n. 7, at 267.
" Id. at 268.
81 id.
82 Exch. Act Release 9252, 1971 WL 127132, at 1 (Jul. 19, 1971).
83 id.
84 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 269 (citing Nat. Resources Def Council, Inc. v. Sec. and Exch. Commn., 389 F. Supp. 689, 694
(D.D.C. 1974) (hereinafter "NRDC 1")).
85 Id. at 275. NRDC proposed that the SEC should promulgate rules requiring additional disclosure, including discussing
major activity the corporation impacts including: (1) pollution or natural resources; (2) current feasibility for reducing
such pollution; (3) the prospects for improving existing technology; (4) existing and projected expenditures for pollution
abatement; (5) legal requirements, including licenses, permits, outstanding court or administrative orders; and (6) pending
or threatened litigation, government and private. Other proposals included requiring disclosure of the registrant's overall
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amendments in April 1973. The 1973 amendments require disclosure of the "material effects which compliance
with environmental laws and regulations may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive
position and the disclosure of material environmental litigation." 86
The SEC stated that more stringent environmental disclosure requirements were unnecessary and would
require a "deluge of confusing disclosures about immaterial governmental environmental proceedings."
Environmentalists did not warmly welcome this policy statement. NRDC continued the litigation and sought a
mandatory injunction to compel the SEC to modify corporate disclosure standards to include environmental
88liabilities and to make those disclosures available to the public in SEC filings. NRDC claimed that the 1971
SEC Interpretive Release and 1973 amendments were inadequate and failed to further the environmental policy
mandated by NEPA. 89
The District Court agreed with NRDC and remanded to the SEC. The remand obligated the SEC to
promulgate a "general statement" to determine "(1) what the SEC views as its statutory obligation to the public
under the securities laws and under NEPA; (2) what rulemaking alternatives it actually considered; and (3) the
reasons for excluding any 'substantial altematives' such as proposals by NRDC and other interested parties." 90
Without appealing the District Court decision, the SEC began reconsideration through participation in
legislative hearings, as well as public notice and comment.91 After five months of hearings,92 "the SEC
concluded that no further mandatory disclosures were necessary but proposed a few minor environmental
disclosure changes in the October 1975 release, Conclusions and Proposed Environmental Disclosures. 93 The
SEC concluded that its broad discretion to promulgate disclosure regulations was limited "to the economic and
investment market protection context of the securities laws." 94 Additionally, the SEC believed that the cost of
environmental disclosure requirements requested by NRDC would outweigh the benefits of such
. . 95requirements.
The SEC then proposed that registrants provide environmental compliance reports indicating where
registrants had "failed within the previous twelve months to meet an applicable environmental standard
established pursuant to any federal statute." 96 Nonetheless, the SEC deemed this disclosure too expansive and
potentially misleading. Stating that investors would not have the environmental expertise to make meaningful
environmental policy statement and a discussion of how the registrant made changes to advance environmental values.
See id. at 275, n. 267, citing Exch. Act Release 11236, 1975 WL 160462, at 2-3 (Feb. 11, 1975).86 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 270 (internal citations omitted).
8 Id. at 271, n. 249. Because of the SEC's requirements, large corporations were required to disclose government-
initiated environmental proceedings involving a small amount of money while they were not required to disclose non-
environmental litigation involving much larger sums of money. See id.
8 See NRDC 1, 389 F. Supp. at 692.
89 See id.
90 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 273.
91 See Exch. Act Release 11236, supra n. 85.
92 The hearing process lasted nineteen days and included fifty-four oral presentations and 353 written comments on the
record, which totaled over ten thousand pages. The responses came from public environmentalist groups and private
corporate interests. As predicted, the environmentalist side advocated more broad environmental disclosure, while the
other denied the effectiveness of the disclosure. Bagby, supra n. 7, at 273, n. 274. See Exch. Act Release 11733, 1975 WL
160503, at 3 (Oct. 14, 1975). The commission gathered nearly 15,000 pages over the five year period leading to the final
rulemaking. Exch. Act Release 12414, 1976 WL 160388, at 3 (May 6, 1976).
9 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 276-77.
94 Id. at 278.
9 See generally Exch. Act Release 11 733, supra n. 92.96 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 278-79.
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comparisons between registrants, the proposals never made it into SEC regulations.97 NRDC believed this final
agency action to be incomplete and again requested judicial review in NRDC 11.98
The court's review in NRDC II found that the SEC's conclusions were arbitrary and capricious because
the SEC failed to consider relevant factors found in the administrative record.99 Like in NRDC I, the court in
NRDC II remanded to the SEC "to engage in reasoned decision-making based on an adequately developed
administrative record and to undertake further rulemaking."',
00
The SEC rejected the remand and appealed to the D.C. Circuit. The appellate court in NRDC III
concluded that the SEC had broad discretion in rulemaking and policy making processes.' 0 Consequently,
because the court deferred to the agency's discretion, the SEC continued the environmental disclosure policy it
had previously developed in its 1971 and 1973 Interpretive Releases. After an administrative enforcement
proceeding by the SEC against United States Steel Corp.,102 the SEC issued another interpretive release, the
1979 Environmental Disclosure Requirement.103 The interpretive release stated that the "Commission's (SEC)
disclosure requirements impose significant obligations with respect to information concerning environmental
protection."' Additionally, the SEC articulated its "longstanding concern about the adequacy of disclosure
with respect to environmental protection requirements, and particularly in light of the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act, registrants should be aware that the Commission will continue to monitor
environmental disclosure as well as bring enforcement actions in appropriate cases of non-compliance."' 0
While the SEC's interpretation of S-K disclosures seemingly takes a proactive environmental role, the agency's
enforcement history has proved otherwise.' 0 6
The SEC again addressed environmental reporting in a 1981 rule proposal, Disclosure of Environmental
Proceedings. This rule created a "three-part materiality threshold for requiring the disclosure of environmental
litigation: (1) all material environmental proceedings, (2) damage actions or governmental proceedings
involving charges, fines, damages, or capital expenditures exceeding ten percent of current assets, and (3) all
government proceedings unless the registrant reasonably believes resulting fines will be less than $1 00,000.i07
These new rules provide the basis for the current SEC environmental disclosure requirements.
9 1d at 279.
98 Id
99 Nat. Resources Def Council, Inc. v. Sec. and Exch. Commnn., 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1204-05 (D.D.C. 1977) (hereinafter
"NRDC II")
00 Id., 432 F. Supp. at 1212.
1o' Nat. Resources Def Council, Inc. v. Sec. and Exch. Comnin., 606 F.2d. 1031, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (hereinafter
"NRDC Ill").
102 SEC brought action against United States Steel Corp. for misleading disclosures. The SEC found Steel Corp.'s
disclosures, while facially accurate, were misleading because "compliance with specific environmental disclosure rules
does not necessarily constitute full compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws." Bagby,
supra n. 7, at 283.
10 Exch. Act Release 16224, supra n. 33.
'0 Id. at 1.
105 Id. at 5.
106 See Southerland, supra n. 29.
107 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 286.
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V. CURRENT SEC ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE RULES AND PROPOSALS TO
FOSTER A MARKET-BASED INCENTIVE PROGRAM
The nucleus of corporate environmental disclosure under SEC regulations is the S-K form.'
Regulation S-K establishes disclosure requirements under both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.10 9 S-K
disclosures are submitted to the SEC under form 10-K.11o Regulation S-K contains an affirmative disclosure
duty and relies on the concept of "'materiality.""' Materiality of information is the trigger for what has to be
disclosed and what information may be withheld.'' 2 While the SEC has provided a definition for "material,"'
it is highly subjective" 4 and the standard creates a great deal of controversy over disclosure limitations."t
Currently, the SEC states that "the term 'material,' when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security
registered."' 16
Regulation S-K contains three explicit tiers of environmental disclosures: Item 101,'1 Item 103,"' and
Item 303. 19 Disclosures under Items 101, 103, and 303 are usually made in the form of narrative
108 The requirements under the S-K regulation follow the 1981 rule proposal for the disclosure of environmental
proceedings.
109 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation § 3.4[5] (4th ed., West 2002).110 10-K is the general form "for annual reports of issuers subject to the Exchange Act's registration and reporting
requirements." Id. at § 9.3.
Feller, supra n. 65, at 228.
112 Hazen, supra n. 109, at § 3.4[2].
3 17 C.F.R. §240.12b-2 (2003).
114 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101, at "Instructions to Item 101."
115 Feller, supra n. 65, at 228.
116 Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2).
1 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a), entitled "Description of the Business," requires registrants to "[d]escribe the general
development of the business of the registrant, its subsidiaries and any predecessor(s) during the past five years, or such
shorter period as the registrant may have been engaged in business." Id It further requires that "[i]nformation shall be
disclosed for earlier periods if material to an understanding of the general development of the business." Id.
11 17 C.F.R. 229.103, entitled "Legal Proceedings," requires registrants to "[d]escribe briefly any material legal
proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of its
subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is subject." Id. It further requires them to "[i]nclude the name of
the court or agency in which the proceedings are pending, the date instituted, the principal parties thereto, a description of
the factual basis alleged to underlie the proceeding and the relief sought. Include similar information as to any such
proceeding known to be contemplated by governmental authorities." Id.119 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1994), entitled "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results
of Operations (MD&A)," requires as follows:
(a) Full Fiscal Years. Discuss the registrant's financial condition, changes in financial condition, and
results of operations. The discussion shall provide information as specified in paragraphs
(a)(1)[Liquidity], (2)[Capital Resources] and (3)[Results of Operations] with respect to liquidity, capital
resources and results of operations and also shall provide such other information that the registrant
believes to be necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in financial condition and
results of operations. Discussion of liquidity and capital resources may be combined whenever the two
topics are interrelated. Where in the registrants judgment a discussion of segment information or of other
subdivisions of the registrants business would be appropriate to an understanding of such business, the
discussion shall focus on each relevant, reportable segment or other subdivision of the business and on the
registrant as a whole.
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discussions. 120 The disclosure requirements must "explain rather than obscure the pertinent issues."l21 The SEC
requires the use of "plain English" in corporate disclosures so that the ordinary investor is able to understand the
disclosures provided.122
A. Item 101
Item 101 requires the registrant to file a general description of the business. This includes financial
information about the industry and its foreign and domestic operations and exports.' 23 "Appropriate disclosures
also shall be made as to the material effects that compliance with Federal, State and local provisions which have
been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the
protection of the environment, may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the
registrant and its subsidiaries. The registrant shall disclose any material estimated capital expenditures for
environmental control facilities for the remainder of its current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for
such further periods as the registrant may deem necessary."l 24 The focus of Item 101 is the material impact that
environmental regulations will have on the corporation's capital expenditures, corporate earnings, and general
competitive position.125
Item 101 is quite broad. It requires the disclosure of compliance costs, including the installation and
maintenance of pollution control equipment.126 Despite the expansive parameters of Item 101, there are
disclosure inadequacies that may inhibit a market-based incentive program.
While cost of compliance must be disclosed under Item 101, so must the cost of non-compliance,
including clean-up costs under CERCLA.127 However, costs of non-compliance are classified merely as
expenses or capital expenditures. If the clean-up costs are part of a remedial agreement with the EPA or other
applicable State agency, they are still categorized as capital expenditures, not penalties.128 While it is important
to foster a cooperative relationship between corporations and the EPA to ensure compliance and clean-up in the
event of contamination, these relationships and the actions taken within them should not be veiled in the
disguise of mere capital expenditures. If corporations are spending significant amounts of corporate funds on
clean-up costs mandated by the EPA, this is equivalent to penalty assessment. Disclosing remediation costs as a
capital expenditure implies that the corporation has complied with environmental standards, when in fact they
have not. Site remediation is an expenditure that would not be required if the company had been compliant with
environmental standards.
For example, Corporation X has entered into an agreement with the EPA to spend $4 million on an on-
site remediation due to a toxic release prohibited under RCRA. This expense in turn is listed and disclosed
under the corporations' Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as a capital expense. To the
common investor, a capital expense is a corporate asset, i.e., a step the corporation has taken to improve its
competitive edge-such as installing $4 million worth of new equipment to increase productivity. The $4
million expense for on-site remediation could have been saved and otherwise invested if the corporation had
been compliant with environmental standards. This expense is, in reality, an unjustified debt, whereas facility
120 Feller, supra n. 65, at 228-29.
121 Hazen, supra n. 109, at § 3.10.
22 Id. at § 3.10[2].
123 17 CFR § 229.101(a-d) (2003).
124 17 CFR § 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
25 See id.
126 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 289.
127 Id. at 289-90.
21 Id. at 290.
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upgrades that increase productivity are assets. Knowing that a corporation is spending money on EPA
mandates-money that it could have otherwise invested-is a material fact that an investor would attach
importance to in determining whether to purchase the registered securities of that corporation. In order for a
market-based incentive program to be successful, investors must have the opportunity to make an educated
choice, not a choice based on disguised facts.
Issues with capital expenditures are again raised in the SEC's coordination of requirements within the
GAAP under Item 101(c). 129 GAAP under Item 101130 is counterintuitive as applied to capital expenditures.
Under GAAP, many contingent environmental liabilities are itemized as capital expenditures and are thus
misleading to the public and investor.
For example, if a corporation incurs expenses (1) in extending the life of their property, (2) in mitigating
environmental contamination, or (3) in the preparation of resale, the expenditures are exempt from being
categorized as an environmental liability. On the contrary, they are merely listed as a corporate capital
expenditure. These categorical exemptions create an extreme danger of investor confusion. If these exclusions
are applied to CERCLA, the danger of investor confusion is highlighted. A corporation may be held liable
under a remedial agreement with the EPA to clean up the contamination of one of their properties. The action is
not listed as a penalty under Item 101, nor is it listed as a contingent liability; on the contrary, it is merely listed
as a capital expenditure. It is obvious that capital expenditures, including environmentally related expenditures,
are important to the average investor in determining a corporation's bottom line. However, simply listing
remedial clean-up as a capital expenditure disguises the environmental liability and is misleading to the ethical
environmental investor. The capital expenditure exemptions within GAAP undermine the environmental
disclosure requirements under Item 101 and thus are inadequate to provide a market-based incentive program.
B. Item 103
Item 103 requires that SEC registrants disclose, on at least a quarterly basis, pending proceedings, or
proceedings known to be contemplated, by a governmental authority to which they are a party, and that arise
under federal, state, or local provisions that have the primary purpose of protecting the environment.' 3 1 In an
Item 103 disclosure, the registrant must articulate the alleged facts of the proceeding, the parties involved, the
relief sought, the date the proceeding was initiated and the venue. 132
Item 103 not only embodies the general materiality threshold that the SEC applies throughout the Act's
regulation, but it creates specific materiality thresholds as applied to environmental disclosures. 3 3
Environmental disclosures under Item 103 are triggered if at least one of three qualifiers is met: material legal
proceedings, if the relief sought amounts to over ten percent of the registrants' current assets and if government
sanctions would amount to more than $100,000.
1. Legal Proceedings and Materiality
The first threshold is one of general materiality as applied to legal proceedings. A legal proceeding that
is "material" to the business or financial condition of the registrant must be disclosed.' 34 There is no bright-line
129 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xi) and (xii).
130 Additionally, Regulation S-X requires the preparation and formatting of quantitative financial information made to the
SEC and to shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. § 210 et seq.
1317 CFR § 229.103.
132 Id. See supra n. 117.
13 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 292.
134 EPA Enforcement Alert, supra n. 26, at 2.
131
MELPR, Vol. 11, No. 2
test for establishing the materiality of a disclosure. However, under Item 103's "materiality" test, there are
specific instances where presumptions are made. A legal proceeding is presumed insignificant if it is "ordinary
routine litigation that is incidental to the business." 35 Greater significance is placed on material insolvency
proceedings and insider litigation. Additionally, disclosures of potential or contemplated governmental
proceedings are deemed material.
The SEC broadly interprets "government proceeding" to include administrative orders and Notice of
Violations issued by the EPA or other authorized State agency.136 While only pending private actions must be
disclosed, all potential government litigation (amounting to more than $100,000 in sanctions) must be
disclosed. The SEC has made the assumption that governmental litigation is less frivolous than private
litigation.137 There is, however, an inadequacy in this distinction. While the interpretation is broad, it excludes
environmental citizen suits. Citizen suits that arise under environmental statutes should not be categorized as
private rights of action for purposes of SEC environmental disclosures. It is apparent that citizen suit
jurisdiction and standing requirements preclude them from being frivolous private rights of action. Moreover,
they can result in significant penalties. Notice of Intent to Sue letters under various environmental statute
citizen suit provisions should be deemed potential "government" litigation. These notice letters should be
subject to mandatory disclosure for contemplated governmental litigation.
2. Aggregation of Damages
The second mandatory disclosure under Item 103 is any legal proceeding that involves primarily a claim
for damages, or that involves potential monetary sanctions, capital expenditures, deferred charges, or charges to
income for which the amount involved, exclusive of interests and costs, exceeds ten percent of the current assets
of the registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis.' 38 This materiality threshold prohibits registrants
from using the routine litigation exemption to avoid disclosure of private environmental proceedings.139 Private
environmental litigation must only be disclosed if aggregated. When aggregated, the damage claims exceed ten
percent of the registrant's current assets or multiple claims arising from the same facts are deemed material.
Within the context of Item 103, "aggregation of litigation" has three definitions: (1) combining all
proceedings arising under the same facts and circumstances; (2) combining all pending or threatened litigation
of all types; and (3) grouping all "similar" proceedings.140 Litigation may be aggregated for various purposes,
including "grouping environmental or other social concern litigation to signal the registrant's commitment to
such matters."I 4
Under Item 103 there is a danger that the aggregation of litigation may inaccurately highlight the
financial magnitude of the litigation, misleading investors. Additionally, the confusion regarding which claims
must be aggregated and when not only leaves investors ill-informed, but exposes the registrant to additional
liabilities by the SEC.142 These dangers could be alleviated through the promulgation of specific and detailed
mandatory aggregation guidelines.
17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
136 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 294.
"' Id. at 292-93.
138 EPA Enforcement Alert, supra n. 26, at 2.
139 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 293.
140 Id. at 296.
141 Id. at 297.
142 A corporation may be subject to suit by either investors or the SEC for failing to disclose all material information
necessary to avoid misleading investors under Rule I Ob-5. The rule states:
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3. Monetary Sanctions Amounting to more than $100,000
The third mandatory disclosure is for monetary sanctions. "If a governmental authority is a party to the
legal proceeding and the registrant has a reasonable belief that the proceeding will result, or has resulted in,
monetary sanctions of $100,000 or more, the legal proceeding must be disclosed." 43 It is noted that the duty to
disclose the information related to these legal proceedings might exist before the actual initiation of a
proceeding, so long as the registrant reasonably expects that the qualifying proceeding will be initiated.144
The $100,000 threshold creates a per se materiality rule for government environmental legal
proceedings.145 Under the per se rule, disclosure is only required if governmental regulators seek more than
$100,000 in sanctions. If a registrant has a reasonable belief that the resulting sanctions will be less than
146$100,000, the proceeding need not be disclosed. The reasonable belief must exist when the registrant files for
10-K with the SEC and the registrant is under the duty to update, correct and monitor the progress of the
litigation. 147
4. Per Se Materiality
The per se materiality rule under Item 103 creates the same controversy as in the capital expenditure
exclusions under GAAP in Item 101 disclosures. The controversy is specifically embedded in the term
"sanction." Governmental proceedings resulting in settlements, consent decrees, or administrative orders that
require environmental mitigation and expenditures amounting to more than $100,000 are not deemed
sanctions. If the expense is not categorized as a sanction, the $100,000 per se materiality rule is not
triggered.149 Likewise, designation as a PRP under CERCLA-which could have astronomical economic
implications-does not trigger disclosure under Item 103.150 Superfund clean-up costs do not constitute
.sanctions" for the purpose of Item 103, but are deemed remedial costs, and thus treated as current charges to
income or capital expenditures.' 5'
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.1Ob-5.
113 EPA Enforcement Alert, supra n. 26, at 2.
144 id.
1 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 293.
46 Id. at 293-94.
1 Id. at 294.
41 Id. at 293-94.
'
49 Id. at 294.
15o Id. at 295.
151 id
1.
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5. Disclosure Proposals
Item 103 of the Regulation S-K disclosure requirements provides a respectable starting point for a
market-based incentive program. However, significant amendments must be made to address ambiguity in
order for a market-based incentive program to be successful.
First, the definition of "governmental proceeding" should be expanded to include 60-day Notice of
Intent to Sue letters under citizen suit litigation. While corporations often view citizen suit threats as
inconsequential, the effects of these suits on the marketplace are significant. The filing of a citizen suit also has
significant implications for the reputation of the business within the community and marketplace alike. Citizen
suit litigation often highlights a corporation's environmental management and its interaction with the local
community. Keeping investors abreast of citizen suit litigation provides them with an indication of the
corporation's actions within its local community and its reputation within the community. This information
gives investors the tools to manage their investments as a green investor and thus pushes the corporation
towards environmental compliance and better environmental management-a market-based incentive program.
Second, the SEC should promulgate concrete aggregation standards. The subjectivity of current
aggregation standards may not only leave investors in the dark regarding the financial implication of the
registrant's contingent environmental liabilities, but may also subject the registrant to additional litigation under
Rule 1Ob-5, the predominant antifraud prohibition designed to prevent inaccurate disclosures. Under current
aggregation standards, remedial settlement costs may not be aggregated to reach the ten percent threshold. This
aggregation standard may be inadequate, in essence misleading the investor. Providing investors with
corporation's complete financial liability baseline maintains a heightened public scrutiny, and that is a specific
deterrent to future corporate non-compliance.
Finally, under the $100.000 per se materiality rule, the term "sanction" should be interpreted more
broadly. The interpretation should include settlements, consent decrees, and administrative orders that do not
utilize the term "sanction" within their text. Furthermore, "sanction" should also include remedial clean-up
costs, site mitigation. and designation as a PRP under CERCLA. While the disclosure of this information may
seem threatening, that threat is exactly the catalyst that will spur voluntary compliance with environmental
standards. Also, regardless of whether the information is threatening, if it is accurate, the investor will want to
receive it.
Adversaries to expansive environmental disclosures and a market-based incentive programs may argue
that this expansion would unduly confuse the investor regarding contingent environmental liabilities. However,
this inference can be rebutted. An educated investor will make note of the link between environmental and
financial performance. If an expansive interpretation of contingent environmental liabilities were adopted,
these disclosures would provide corporations with an incentive to address the liabilities expeditiously. Raising
the level of corporate awareness surrounding environmental performance and management directly addresses a
market-based incentive program. Providing investors with full and fair environmental disclosure enables the
investor to select the premium environmental corporation and weed out the mediocre corporations. This is the
basis of a general incentive for corporations to improve their environmental performance, which is exactly what
makes market-based incentive programs work.
C. Item 303
Item 303 requires environmental disclosures in the form of a Management Discussion and Analysis
("MD&A"). The MD&A contains the disclosure of environmental contingencies that may reasonably have a
material impact on net sales, revenue, or income from continuing operations.152 It gives the investors the
152 EPA Enforcement Alert, supra n. 26, at 2.
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opportunity "to look at the registrant through the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospective
analysis."',5 3 The duty of disclosure in an MD&A report is much broader than disclosure provisions in Item
103. "MD&A mandates disclosure of specific forward-looking information . . . [if it is] reasonably likely to
have a material effect."' 5 4
Disclosures in the MD&A are made in a "plain English"15 narrative form and require the disclosure of
management's economic judgments and predictions.15 6 The plain English narrative form and prospective
analysis of the MD&A is very flexible and therefore open to ambiguity and significant non-disclosure.'57
Environmental disclosures are significantly impacted because the MD&A "imposes a separate duty on
management to disclose its interpretation of the impact of environmental regulation on the registrant's
operations and performance." 5 8
To alleviate the ambiguity of Item 303 and to address the considerable discretion that a registrant has
regarding the MD&A disclosures, in 1989 the SEC set forth the 1989 Guidance.159 The Guidance provides a
two-part analysis for environmental disclosure determinations under Item 303. First, the registrant must
determine if a contingent event (or liability) 160 is reasonably likely to occur. 161 There is a presumption that the
event will in fact occur unless the registrant can prove that the event is not reasonably likely to occur.162 If the
registrant determines that the event is reasonably likely to occur, the contingent event must then be disclosed.163
Only if the registrant makes the determination that the "event's occurrence is not reasonably likely to have a
material effect on the company" may it avoid disclosure.164
The SEC's Guidance places the burden of proof on the registrant. Nevertheless, management still has
extremely broad discretion, and significant problems arise in the context of materiality and corporate
environmental disclosures. Much of the law of environmental disclosure under the Blue Sky Laws is unsettled,
which results in even broader discretion.' 65 Quite simply, it is too easy for a corporation to defend a decision
not to disclose.' 66
Even though, in theory, the MD&A under Item 303 offers the investor a view from the managerial
perspective, and the duty to disclose under regulation S-K is affirmative, it is subjectively based upon
materiality. This subjective approach makes it too easy for the registrant to opt for nondisclosure, claiming that
the information is immaterial. In order for the MD&A to be a successful tool utilized by the investor to
promote a market-based incentive program, the doctrine of materiality under the SEC needs to be updated to
address environmental disclosure concerns.
5 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 295.
154 Id. at 303-04.
" Hazen, supra n. 109, at 3.10[2].
1s6 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 300.
158 id
1 Secs. Act Release 6835, 1989 WL 270492 (May 24, 1989).
16o For example, under the Clean Air Act, if the EPA proposed rules to lower baseline emission standards, the registrant
must make a determination of whether or not the proposed rules would be approved and thus put into effect.
161 Feller, supra n. 65, at 233.
16 2 id.
163 Id.
61 Id at 234.
166id
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The concept of materiality is embedded in both the regulations and the securities laws themselves. 67
The materiality concept has found its way into environmental disclosures through the SEC's balancing of two
competing concerns: (1) protecting the investor and (2) not overburdening the disclosure requirements with
information that has questionable value.' 68
When the concept of materiality is thrust into the realm of environmental disclosures, the regulations fail
to balance the competing concerns. Current materiality standards under environmental disclosures do not
provide registrants with adequate guidelines. Registrants must make a subjective determination regarding the
qualitative and quantitative values of their contingent environmental liabilities. Due to the subjective nature of
this determination, disclosure is varied and ultimately unenforceable.
If the SEC, in conjunction with the EPA, developed objective standards regarding the materiality of
contingent environmental liabilities, including costs and performance measures, it would address concerns over
the registrant's broad discretion in determinations about materiality.' 70
In addition to rule promulgation regarding the concept of materiality, the SEC should take a more
proactive role in the enforcement of existing requirements. A 1998 EPA study found a non-reporting rate of 74
percent on the disclosure of environmental legal proceedings in registrant's 10-K statements.' 7 1 If investor
protection is the primary focus of the SEC, a more active role in enforcement would bring this ideal to fruition.
Environmental disclosures under Regulation S-K must be more meaningful and thus foster investor protection.
In order for investors to create an environmental compliance incentive for corporations, they must have direct
and adequate access to the corporation's environmental performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Current environmental disclosure regulations under various environmental statutes, coupled with more
expansive SEC environmental disclosures and more stringent SEC disclosures, provide the information an
ethical environmental investor needs to facilitate a market-based incentive program (which fosters
environmental compliance). Disclosures under Regulation S-K are the basis for corporate disclosure of
information regarding the impact environmental regulations, environmental litigation, and contingent
environmental liabilities. While this regulation provides a building block to foster market-based incentives, in
order to be successful, environmental disclosures need to be thorough and candid. Regulation S-K lacks the
requisite teeth to provide adequate enforcement under the existing SEC requirements. The modification of the
materiality standards is imperative to reforming SEC disclosure requirements to provide for a market-based
incentive environmental program.
The SEC should promulgate new rules specifically regarding the materiality of environmental
disclosures. These rules should address the SEC's intent to require mandatory disclosure requirements for
significant environmental contingencies. Additionally, rules should be promulgated to allow for the
aggregation of contingent environmental liability. The aggregation of these liabilities will allow consumers,
stockholders, and proxy voters to make informed decisions regarding a corporation's green management and its
future actions.
167 Id. at 252. (Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j and § 78m (the statutory sources of authority for reporting environmental
liabilities) with the rules promulgated thereunder in 17 C.F.R. pt. 229)168 d
170 Id. at 252-53.
1i Franco, supra n. 2, at 7.
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In the past, the SEC has stated that its broad discretion to promulgate disclosure regulations was "limited
to the economic and investment market protection context of the securities laws." 72 Since the SEC made that
statement in the mid 1970's, it has been established that good environmental management fosters corporate
competition and substantial benefits to both the corporation and the investor/shareholder. The theory of using
green management as a fiduciary'73 can function as the means to expand SEC environmental disclosure
regulations. The expansion of these regulations-to allow for more expansive and coherent disclosures-would
foster a market-based incentive program. Moreover, the SEC should take a more proactive role in the
enforcement of corporate environmental disclosures. This enforcement is mandated due to the SEC's
interpretation of their regulatory purpose-investor protection. The success of a market-based incentive
program would alleviate much of the burden the EPA has had on environmental regulatory enforcement and
become a vehicle for heightened environmental compliance and standards.
The enforcement of environmental disclosure requirements helps to ensure that companies complying
with these obligations are not disadvantaged in the marketplace by firms that ignore the duty to disclose their
environmental liabilities.174 The public availability of information regarding environmental performance and
compliance will result in market forces that can positively influence environmental behavior.175
While the EPA has a dwindling enforcement budget, new and innovative solutions should be utilized to
ensure environmental compliance and pollution control. These can be implemented not only through successful
Green Management of corporations, but though environmental disclosures and the enforcement of proper
disclosure, giving the public a market-based solution to our growing environmental problems.
In1 Bagby, supra n. 7, at 279.
"3 See Goodman, supra n. 1.
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